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1. Background: Inadequacy of the US data protection regime: clear to everyone after Snowden  
 
Already the Europol-US agreement of December 20, 20021 and the EU-US mutual assistance treaty in 
criminal matters of June 25, 20032, both concluded in the immediate aftermath of 9/11, set the tone. 
Neither in terms of police or judicial cooperation the adequacy of the US data protection level could 
be established, whilst both the (then) Europol-Agreement and Directive 95/463 required so. Purpose 
limitation (specialty)4 in the use of data provided by Europol or EU member states proved an almost 
nugatory concept, where the US were allowed to freely share information that was procured in crimi-
nal cases for purely administrative or intelligence purposes.5 Later, in 2006, it was revealed that the US 
Treasury had procured access to worldwide scriptural bank transactions by means of administrative 
subpoenas vis-à-vis the US hub of the (Belgium-based) Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Tel-
ecommunication (SWIFT) in the context of combating the financing of terrorism, but surely alluding to 
other (including economic) goals as well.6 Moreover, SWIFT itself defected herein, as its US hub did not 
endorse the so-called Safe Harbour principles.7 These had been developed in 2000 by the European 
                                                 
1 Supplemental agreement between the Europol Police Office and the United States of America on the exchange of personal 
data and related information, 20.12.2002. Available via: https://www.europol.europa.eu/content/supplemental-agreement-
between-europol-police-office-and-united-states-america.   
2 Agreement on mutual legal assistance between the European Union and the United States of America, OJ L 181/34, 
19.07.2003. Available via: http://ec.europa.eu/world/agreements/downloadFile.do?fullText=yes&treatyTransId=10101.   
3 Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 on the protection of individuals with 
regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, OJ L 281, 23.11.1995. Available via: 
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:31995L0046:en:HTML.   
4 E. De Busser (2009). Purpose limitation in EU-US data exchange in criminal matters: the remains of the day. In: M. Cools, S. 
De Kimpe, B. De Ruyver, M. Easton, L. Pauwels, P. Ponsaers, G. Vande Walle, et al. (Eds.). Readings on criminal justice, criminal 
law and policing, (Vol. 2). Antwerp, Belgium ; Apeldoorn, The Netherlands: Maklu, pp. 163–201. 
5 S. Peers (2003). The  exchange  of  personal  data  between  Europol  and  the  USA. Statewatch Analysis, pp. 1-3. Available 
via: www.statewatch.org; G. Vermeulen (2004). Transatlantisch monsterverbond of verstandshuwelijk? Over het verschil tus-
sen oorlog en juridische strijd tegen terreur en de versterkte politie- en justitiesamenwerking tussen EU en VS. Panopticon, 
25(1), pp. 90-107; P. De Hert & B. De Schutter (2008). International Transfers of Data in the Field of JHA: The Lessons of 
Europol, PNR and Swift. In: B. MARTENCZUK and S. VAN THIEL (eds.), Justice, Liberty, Security: New Challenges for EU External 
Relations, VUB Press, Brussels, (I.E.S. series nr. 11), pp. 326-327 and pp. 329-333. 
6 See the Privacy Commission’s opinion on the Transfer of Personal Data by the CSLR SWIFT by Virtue of UST (OFAC), 37/2006. 
Available via: https://www.privacycommission.be/sites/privacycommission/files/documents/advies_37_2006_1.pdf; Fur-
thermore, see: P.M. Connorton (2007). Tracking Terrorist Financing through SWIFT: When U.S. subpoenas and foreign privacy 
law collide. Fordam Law Review, 76(1), pp. 283-322.   
7 G. Gonzalez Fuster, P. De Hert & S.  Gutwirth (2008). SWIFT and the vulnerability of transatlantic data transfers. International 
Review of Law Computers & Technology, Vol. 22,Nos. 1-2, March –July, pp. 191-202. 
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Commission8 to ensure that, given that the US data protection regime in itself could not be qualified 
as adequate, commercial EU-US data transfers would nonetheless be enabled.9 Companies that indi-
cated (and self-certified) to comply with the principles laid down in the Commission’s Safe Harbour 
decision, were to be considered as – from a data protection perspective – ‘safe harbours’ within US 
territory, to which EU companies were allowed to transfer data. This, however, was not the case for 
the SWIFT hub in the US, so that the Belgian company should have refrained from localizing (backup) 
data in it. The EU’s response to this scandal was all but convincing. While intra-European payment 
transactions were admittedly no longer sent to the US hub (albeit that in the meantime SWIFT had 
registered it as a ‘safe harbour’), the Commission negotiated on behalf of the EU an agreement with 
the US, allowing the latter, via a Europol ‘filter’ (which painfully lacks filtering capacity proper) to obtain 
bulk-access on a case-by-case basis to these intra-European payment transactions. This TFTP-agree-
ment (Terrorist Financing Tracking Program10), completed in 2010, furthermore contains an article in 
which the US Treasury is axiomatically declared as adequate in terms of data protection.11 Notwith-
standing, and given the known practice of wide data-sharing between US government administrations 
and bodies contrary to the European purpose limitation principle, the inadequacy of the US data pro-
tection regime was at the time beyond reasonable doubt. That the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance 
Act (FISA)12, altered post-9/11 with the Patriot Act13 and further expanded in 200814, allowed the US 
to monitor – both with or without a court order – electronic communication in a way that was dispro-
portionate, worldwide and in bulk, was clear as well.15 This and more was confirmed in the Summer of 
2013 with the revelations of whistleblower Edward Snowden.16 These revelations were particularly 
shocking because of the revealed extent of the interception practices of the NSA (National Security 
                                                 
8 Commission Decision of 26 July 2000 pursuant to Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on the 
adequacy of the protection provided by the safe harbour privacy principles and related frequently asked questions issued by 
the US Department of Commerce, 2000/520/EC, OJ L 215, 25.08.2000.  
9 See, f.i.: W.J. Long & M.P. Quek (2002). Personal data privacy protection in an age of globalization: the US-EU safe harbor 
compromise. Journal of European Public Policy, 9(3), pp. 325-344. 
10Agreement between the European Union and the United States of America on the processing and transfer of Financial 
Messaging Data from the European Union to the United States for purposes of the Terrorist Finance Tracking Program, OJ L 
008, 13.01.2010. Available via: 
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:22010A0113%2801%29&from=EN.   
11 Article 6 of the TFTP Agreement (fn. 6) reads: “ […] the U.S. Treasury Department is deemed to ensure an adequate level 
of data protection for the processing of financial payment messaging and related data transferred from the European Union 
to the United States for purposes of this Agreement.” 
12 The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801-11, 1821-29, 1841-46, 1861-62, 1871. Available via: 
https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/50/chapter-36/subchapter-I.   
13 Uniting and Strengthening America by providing appropriate tools required to intercept and obstruct terrorism (USA Patriot 
Act) Act of 2001, Pub. L. 107-56; 10/26/01. Available via: https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PLAW-107publ56/pdf/PLAW-
107publ56.pdf.; See also: P.T. Jaeger, J.C. Bertot & C.R. McClure (2003). The  impact  of  the  USA Patriot Act on collection and 
analysis of personal information under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act. Government Information Quarterly, no. 20, 
pp. 295-314. 
14Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L.110-261; 7/10/2008. Available via: 
https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PLAW-110publ261/pdf/PLAW-110publ261.pdf.   
15 E. De Busser (2009). Purpose limitation in EU-US data exchange in criminal matters: the remains of the day. In: M. Cools, S. 
De Kimpe, B. De Ruyver, M. Easton, L. Pauwels, P. Ponsaers, G. Vande Walle, et al. (Eds.). Readings on criminal justice, criminal 
law and policing, (Vol. 2). Antwerp, Belgium ; Apeldoorn, The Netherlands: Maklu, pp. 163–201; E. De Busser (2009). Data 
Protection in EU and US Criminal Cooperation, Antwerp–Apeldoorn–Portland: Maklu, 474p. 
16 The outrage broke in June 2013, when the Guardian first reported that the US National Security Agency (NSA) was collecting 
the telephone records of tens of millions of Americans, see: G. Greenwald (2013). NSA collecting phone records of millions of 
Verizon customers daily. The Guardian, 06.06.2013. Available via: http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/06/nsa-
phone-records-verizon-court-order; See also: M-R. Papandrea (2014). Leaker Traitor Whistleblower Spy: National Security 
Leaks and the First Amendment. Boston University Law Review, 94(2), pp. 449-544. 
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Agency) – inter alia through the PRISM programme – and the British intelligence service GCHQ’s (Gov-
ernment Communications Headquarters)17 – which for years had spied on Belgacom International Car-
rier Service (Bics). As a subsidiary of the current Proximus, Bics provides worldwide hardware through 
which telecom companies and government agencies run their electronic communication (internet-, 
telephony-, mobile- and texting-traffic). Moreover, the intense mutual cooperation between the NSA 
and GCHQ, and within the so-called Five Eyes Community (comprising the intelligence services of Can-
ada, Australia and New Zealand) was confirmed by the revelations, this regardless of the fact that many 
were aware that these five, within the context of Echelon, were already monitoring worldwide satellite 
communications for decennia, including for commercial purposes. Already in 2000, the European Par-
liament had instigated an investigative commission against these practices.18 From the US side, the 
publication of NSA-newsletters in the Summer of 2015 as a result of the Snowden revelations, plainly 
confirmed these allegations.19 
 
2. Safe Harbour unsafe  
 
Using the leverage handed to her with the Lisbon Treaty20, former Commissioner of Justice Reding 
launched an ambitious legislative data protection package at the outset of 2012.21 A proposed Regula-
tion was initiated to replace Directive 95/4622 , and aimed inter alia to bind (US) service providers on 
EU territory by European rules on data protection. In parallel, a proposed Directive had to upgrade the 
2008 Framework Decision on data protection in the sphere of police and judicial cooperation in crimi-
nal matters.23 In December 2015, after a great deal of to-ing and fro-ing – and almost four years and a 
European Commission later –  political agreement was reached on the new Regulation and the Di-
rective.24 Both of them will be formally accepted by the Summer and member states are due to apply 
them within as little as two years’ time. The adequacy requirement for data transfers to third states 
                                                 
17 The involvement of the British GCHQ was revealed by the Guardian on the 21st of June, 2013. See: E. MacAskill, J. Borger, 
N. Hopkins, N. Davies & J. Ball (2013). GCHQ taps fibre-optic cables for secret access to world's communications. The Guard-
ian, 21.06.2013. Available via: http://www.theguardian.com/uk/2013/jun/21/gchq-cables-secret-world-communications-
nsa.  
18 See European Parliament decision setting up a temporary committee on the ECHELON interception system (http://www.eu-
roparl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=MOTION&reference=B5-2000-0593&language=EN) and the final report that was 
published in 2001: Report on the existence of a global system for the interception of private and commercial communications 
(ECHELON interception system) (2001/2098(INI)), FINAL A5-0264/2001 PAR1, 11.07.2001. See also: F. Piodi & I. Mombelli 
(2014).  The ECHELON Affair. The European Parliament and the Global Inter-ception System 1998 – 2002, European Parlia-
ment History Series, European Parliamentary Research Service (EPRS), Luxembourg. Available via:  http://www.europarl.eu-
ropa.eu/EPRS/EPRS_STUDY_538877_AffaireEchelon-EN.pdf.    
19 See, f.i.: H. Farrell & A. Newman (2016). Transatlantic Data War. Europe fights back against the NSA. Foreign Affairs, 95(1), 
pp. 124-133.  
20 Treaty of Lisbon Amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty establishing the European Community, OJ 2007/C 
306/01, 17.12.2007.   
21 V.  Reding (2012). The  European  data protection framework for the twenty-first century. International Data Privacy Law, 
Vol. 2, No. 3, pp. 119-129; Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the Economic and 
Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions: 'Safeguarding Privacy in a Connected World -A European Data Protec-
tion  Framework  for  the  21st  Century,  COM (2012)  9  final. 
22 C.J.  Bennet & C.D. Raab (1997). The  Adequacy  of  Privacy:  the  European  Union  Data Protection Directive and the North 
American Response. The Information Society, Vol. 13, p. 252. 
23 Council Framework Decision 2008/977/JHA of 27 November 2008 on the protection of personal data processed in the 
framework of police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters, OJ L 350, 30.12.2008; See also: E. De Busser & G. Vermeulen 
(2010). Towards a coherent EU policy on outgoing data transfers for use in criminal matters? The adequacy requirement and 
the framework decision on data protection in criminal matters. A transatlantic exercise in adequacy. In: M. Cools, B. De Ruy-
ver, M. Easton, L. Pauwels, P. Ponsaers, G. Vande Walle, T. Vander Beken, et al. (Eds.). EU and International Crime Control 
(Vol. 4). Antwerpen–Apeldoorn–Portland: Maklu, pp. 95–122. 
24 For an overview of the route leading up to these instruments, see the (then: 2004-2014) European  Data  Protection  Su-
pervisor’s overview:  P. Hustinx (2015). EU Data Protection Law: The Review of Directive 95/46/EC and the Proposed General 
Data Protection Regulation. Available via: 
https://secure.edps.europa.eu/EDPSWEB/webdav/site/mySite/shared/Documents/EDPS/Publications/Speeches/2014/14-
09-15_Article_EUI_EN.pdf.  
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moreover remains intact. Reding also took up the defense for EU citizens for what concerns US access 
to their personal data.25 Just few months after the Snowden revelations, she came up with two parallel 
communications at the end of November 2013: ‘Rebuilding Trust in EU-US Data Flows’ (COM(2013) 
846 final)26 and ‘communication on the functioning of the Safe Harbour from the perspective of EU 
citizens and companies established in the EU’ (COM(2013) 847 final)27 (hereafter: Safe Harbour com-
munication). The first communication was accompanied by a report containing the 'findings on the ad-
hoc workgroup data protection of the EU and the US'28, which, among others, stipulated that the im-
provements in the Safe Harbour decision should address the 'structural deficiencies in relation to the 
transparency and enforcement, the material safe harbour principles and the functioning of the excep-
tion for national security’ [emphasis added]. After all, the Safe Harbour decision explicitly determined 
that the demands of ‘national security, public interest and law enforcement’ of the US supersede the 
Safe Harbour principles (annex I, paragraph 4). As it turned out, these exceptions rendered the safe 
harbours unsafe. In its 2013 Safe Harbour communication, the Commission established that ‘all com-
panies  involved in the PRISM-programme, and which grant access to US authorities to data stored and 
processed in the US, appear  to  be  Safe  Harbour  certified.’ As such, ‘[t]his has made the Safe Harbour 
scheme one of the conduits through  which access is given to US intelligence authorities to collecting  
personal data initially processed in the EU’ (point 7). This was indeed the case: Microsoft, Google, Fa-
cebook, Apple, Yahoo!, Skype, YouTube … all of them were self-certified under Safe Harbour and sim-
ultaneously involved in the PRISM-programme. The Commission concluded that ‘[t]he large scale na-
ture of these programmes may [have] result[ed] in [more] data transferred under Safe Harbour being 
accessed  and  further processed by US authorities beyond what is strictly necessary and proportionate 
to the protection of national security as foreseen under the exception provided in the Safe Harbour 
Decision’ [emphasis added].29 
 
3. Safe Harbour is dead 
 
Real urgency in the negotiations with the US only (re)surfaced following the ruling of the Court of 
Justice on October 6, 2015 in response to the appeal of Max Schrems against the Irish privacy commis-
sioner (in proceedings against Facebook30, that has its European headquarters established in Dublin) 
before the Irish High Court.31 The latter had requested a preliminary ruling herein of the Court in Lux-
embourg, and namely whether the Irish privacy commissioner (as it had itself upheld) was bound by 
the Safe Harbour decision of the Commission to the extent that it could no longer be questioned 
whether the US data protection regime was adequate, as such leading the Irish privacy commissioner 
to conclude that it could not investigate the complaint filed by Schrems. The latter held a contradictory 
argumentation based on the post-Snowden ascertainment that Facebook was active in the PRISM-pro-
gramme, regardless of its self-certification under the Safe Harbour principles).32 The Court concluded 
                                                 
25See, f.i.: E. De Busser (2014). Privatization of Information and the Data Protection Reform. In: S. Gutwirth et al. (eds.). Re-
loading Data Protection. Springer Science+ Business Media Dordrecht, pp. 129-149.  
26 European Commission (2013). Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council. Rebuild-
ing Trust in EU-US Data Flows, COM(2013) 846 final. Available via: 
 http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/files/com_2013_846_en.pdf. 
27 European Commission (2013). Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on the 
Functioning of the Safe Harbour from the Perspective of EU Citizens and Companies Established in the EU, COM(2013) 847 
final. Available via: http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/files/com_2013_847_en.pdf. 
28 Report on the Findings of the EU Co-Chairs of the Ad Hoc EU-US Working Group on Data Protection, 27.11.2013. Available 
via: 
 http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/files/report-findings-of-the-ad-hoc-eu-us-working-group-on-data-protec-
tion.pdf.   
29 Safe Harbour Communication (fn. 22), point 7.1.  
30See, f.i.: N. Simmons (2012). Facebook and the Privacy Frontier. Business Law Review, 33(3), pp. 58-62. Available via: 
http://www.kluwerlawonline.com/document.php?id=BULA2012013. 
31 CJEU October 6, 2015, case C-362/14 (Maximillian Schrems v. Data Protection Commissioner). 
32 A. Kirchner (2012). Reflections on privacy in the age of global electronic data processing with a focus on data processing 
practices of facebook. Masaryk University Journal of Law and Technology, 6(1), pp. 73-86; M. Hildebrandt (2013). The rule of 
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inter alia that ‘[t]he right to respect for private life, guaranteed by Article 7 of the Charter and by the 
core values common to the traditions of the Member States, would be rendered meaningless if the 
State authorities were authorised to access electronic communications on a casual and generalised 
basis without any objective justification based on considerations of national security or the prevention 
of crime that are specific to the individual concerned and without those practices being accompanied 
by appropriate and verifiable safeguards’ [emphasis added] (paragraph 34). The Court furthermore 
recalled, with explicit reference to its Data Retention judgement of April 8, 201433 (in which the Court 
had declared the Data Retention Directive invalid) and its previous judgements as cited under points 
54 & 55 of its Data Retention judgement, its consistent case-law that ‘EU legislation involving interfer-
ence with the fundamental rights guaranteed by Articles 7 and 8 of the Charter [regarding the respect 
for private and family life and the protection of personal data respectively] must, according to the 
Court’s settled case-law, lay down clear and precise rules governing the scope and application of a 
measure […]’ [emphasis added] (paragraph 91). Still with reference to the Data Retention judgement 
(and the cited case-law under point 52 hereof), the Court jointly stated that ‘furthermore and above 
all, protection of the fundamental right to respect for private life at EU level requires derogations and 
limitations in relation to the protection of personal data to apply only in so far as is strictly necessary’ 
[emphasis added] (paragraph 92), whereby of course a ‘[l]egislation is not limited to what is strictly 
necessary where it authorises, on a generalised basis, storage of all the personal data of all the persons 
whose data has been transferred from the European Union to the United States without any differen-
tiation, limitation or exception being made in the light of the objective pursued and without an objec-
tive criterion being laid down by which to determine the limits of the access of the public authorities 
to the data, and of its subsequent use, for purposes which are specific, strictly restricted and capable 
of justifying the interference which both access to that data and its use entail’ [emphasis added] (par-
agraph 93). In other words: collection (storage), access and use for reasons of national security, public 
interest or law enforcement require specific and precise criteria and are but allowed when strictly nec-
essary for specific purposes that are strictly restricted. Given the fact that the Commission omitted to 
implement such an assessment in its Safe Harbour decision, the Court decided on the invalidity of the 
latter. Hence, with the Schrems case, the Court firmly put the finger on the following issue: engage-
ments by US companies through self-certification under the Safe Harbour principles do not provide 
(adequate) protection as long as it remains unclear whether, despite large scale interception pro-
grammes like PRISM, the US privacy regime may be considered as adequate. With the sudden invalidity 
of the Safe Harbour decision, a replacement instrument became an urgent necessity. The European 
Commission (since November 2014 the Juncker Commission, with Věra Jourová as the Commissioner 
for justice, fundamental rights and citizenship competent inter alia for data protection, under custody 
of super-commissioner (vice-president of the Commission) Frans Timmermans) was quick to temper 
                                                 
law in cyberspace?, Inaugural Lecture, Chair of Smart Environ-ments, Data Protection and the Rule of Law, Institute of Com-
puting and Information Sciences (iCIS), Nijmegen: Radboud University. Available via: http://works.bepress.com/mireille_hil-
debrandt/48/; B.J. Koops (2014). The trouble with European data protection law. International Data Privacy Law, 
doi:10.1093/idpl/ipu023. Available via: 
http://m.isaca.org/Groups/Professional-English/privacy-data-protection/GroupDocuments/2014-08-
24%20%20The%20Trouble%20with%20European%20Data%20Protection%20Law.pdf.; F. Coudert (2015). Schrems vs. Data 
Protection Commissioner: a slap on the wrist for the Commission and new powers for data protection authorities, European 
Law Blog, 15.10.2015. Available online via: 
https://lirias.kuleuven.be/bitstream/123456789/511500/1/FannyCoudert_Post+CJEU+Schrems_final.pdf.; R. Day (2015). Let 
the magistrates revolt: A review of search warrant applications for electronic in-formation possessed by online services, Uni-
versity of Kansas Law Review, 64(2), pp. 491-526; S. Darcy (2015). Battling for the Rights to Privacy and Data Protection in the 
Irish Courts. Utrecht Journal of International and European Law, 31(80), pp.131–136. DOI: http://doi.org/10.5334/ujiel.cv; D. 
Flint (2015). Computers and internet: Sunk without a trace – the demise of safe harbor. Business Law Review, 36(6), pp. 236-
237. Available via: 
http://www.kluwerlawonline.com/document.php?id=BULA2015031; H. Crowther (2016). Invalidity  of  the  US  Safe  Harbor  
framework: what does it mean? Journal of Intellectual Property Law & Practice, 11(2), pp. 88-90; N. Ni Loideain (2016). The 
End of Safe Harbor: Implications for EU Digital Privacy and Data Protection Law, Journal of Internet Law, Vol. 19, No. 8, Feb-
ruary 2016. 
33 CJEU April 8, 2014, cases C 293/12 & C 594/12, ECLI:EU:C:2014:238 (Digital Rights Ireland a.o.).  
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emotions. In a communication on the very day of the Court’s decision, Timmermans recognized the 
Court’s confirmation of the necessity ‘of having robust data protection safeguards in place before 
transferring citizens’ data’. He furthermore added that, since its Safe Harbour communication, the 
Commission was working with the US authorities ‘to make data transfers safer for European citizens’ 
[emphasis added] and that, in light of the Schrems judgement, it would continue to work ‘towards a 
renewed and safe framework for the transfer of personal data across the Atlantic’ [emphasis added].34             
 
 
4. Long live the privacy shield!  
 
On February 29, 2016, the Commission presented its eagerly awaited ‘solution’. It launched a new 
communication, titled ‘Transatlantic Data Flows: Restoring Trust through Strong Safeguards’35, and im-
mediately attached hereto – in replacement of the invalidated Safe Harbour decision – its draft ade-
quacy decision36 of the US data protection regime (with 7 annexes) for data transfers under the pro-
tection of the so-called ‘EU-US privacy shield’. On the JHA Council the day after, Jourovà hooted: ‘Writ-
ten assurances regarding the limitations on access to data by U.S. public authorities on national secu-
rity grounds’. Before we can evaluate the privacy shield on its merits, it pays to bear in mind that, 
conceptually, it bears a very strong resemblance with the Safe Harbour regime. The Safe Harbour prin-
ciples have now been renamed as privacy principles, which should serve as the new basis for data 
transfers coming from the EU to organizations – essentially: corporations – in the US who endorse 
these principles through the act of self-certification. Completing mirroring the Safe Harbour decision, 
there is furthermore a general exception hereto should national security, public interest or law en-
forcement require so. Hence, the central question is whether the ‘limitations’ and ‘safeguards’ that 
are now presented by the privacy shield – the Safe Harbour regime did not foresee any of these – are 
convincing enough. The convulsive way in which the European Commission tried to convince everyone, 
through the means of its communication and the attached draft adequacy decision, of the satisfactory 
nature of this new regime, and that from now on the US will effectively display an adequate data pro-
tection level under the privacy shield, is painful to witness. The heydays of former European justice 
commissioner Reding seem long gone. Apparently, demanding a genuine commitment of the US to 
refrain from collecting in bulk personal data of EU citizens or coming from the EU, and to only intercept 
communications and other personal data when strictly necessary and proportionate, was a political 
bridge too far. It seems that Commissioner Jourová (and super-commissioner Timmermans) have suc-
cumbed to the dominant importance of maintaining benevolent trans-Atlantic trade relations. Allow-
ing trans-Atlantic transfers of personal data from companies or their subsidiaries in the EU to compa-
nies based in the US is after all the primordial goal of the privacy shield. As it turns out, negotiating 
(too) tough was apparently not considered an option herein. Nonetheless, one fails to see why such a 
commercial transfer of personal data without the option to do so in bulk, or without resorting to a 
capturing of such data that is disproportionate for intelligence or law enforcement purposes, would 
have been too high of a stake during negotiations. Companies - including the major US players like 
Google, Apple, Facebook and Microsoft - will in the long run not benefit from the fact that they will not 
be able to protect the data of their European or other users against government access. It is regrettable 
that they themselves seem insufficiently aware of this, leaving scarce counter-examples like the Apple-
                                                 
34 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on the transfer of personal data from 
the EU to the United States of America under Directive 95/46/EC following the Judgment by the Court of Justice in Case C-
362/14 (Schrems), COM(2015) 566 final, 06.11.2015.  
35 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council. Transatlantic Data Flows: Restoring 
Trust through Strong Safeguards, COM(2016) 117 final, Brussels, 29 February 2016. 
36 Commission Implementing Decision of xxx pursuant to Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council 
on the adequacy of the protection provided by the EU-U.S. Privacy Shield. 
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FBI clash37 aside. In the meantime, the very minimum is to burst the bubble of the European Commis-
sion's discourse in the privacy shield communication and ditto draft adequacy decision. The 'limita-
tions' and 'safeguards' that the shield - according to the Commission - offers against US data collection 
in the interest of national security (by the intelligence services), public interest or law enforcement (by 
the police) are by absolutely no means sufficient. A simple focused reading and concise analysis hereof 
suffice to show this.               
 
5. Limitations and safeguards regarding data collection in the interest of national security  
 
a. Collection and access v. access and use: One big amalgamation 
 
The Commission analysis is misleading because it repeatedly posits that the 'limitations' to which the 
US will commit and that are applicable on the parts concerning 'access' and 'use' (see paragraph 55 of 
the draft adequacy decision) for the purpose of national security, public interest or law enforcement, 
will be sufficient in light of EU law to allude to an adequate level of data protection. According to EU 
law, however, processing of personal data takes place as soon as 'collection' takes place, regardless of 
any future 'access' to this data or the 'use' hereof. By systematically wielding the term 'access' instead 
of 'collection', or by posing as if the limitations regarding 'access' will  - with the proverbial single stroke 
of a brush - also include sufficient limitations in terms of 'collection', the Commission is wilfully pulling 
the leg of its reader. To the extent still necessary, it suffices to recall the previously mentioned Data 
Retention judgement of the Court of Justice. In the latter, the Court abundantly made clear that limi-
tations are necessary both in the phase of the 'collection' of personal data (in casu retention or con-
servation by suppliers of electronic communication services of traffic data in fixed and mobile teleph-
ony, internet access, internet e-mail and internet telephony) as in the phases of 'accessing' this data 
or its later 'use' (in casu by the competent police and judicial authorities). As such, the Commission 
skips a step, or at least tries to maintain the mirage that the privacy shield's limitations in terms of 
'access' and 'use' will suffice to speak of an adequate data protection. This, however, is a flagrantly 
false rhetoric. Just the same, also the part that concerns the initial 'collection' of personal data by the 
competent authorities (in casu the US intelligence or law enforcement services) is bound by strict re-
quirements. After all, one of the reasons why the Court dismissed the Data Retention directive as in-
valid (see paragraph 59) was because 'in particular, it is not restricted to a retention in relation (i) to 
data pertaining to a particular time period and/or a particular geographical zone and/or to a circle of 
particular persons likely to be involved, in one way or another, in a serious crime, or (ii) to persons who 
could, for other reasons, contribute, by the retention of their data, to the prevention, detection or 
prosecution of serious offences'. It is important to bear in mind that back then, the debate was only 
on the conservation (and as such 'collection') by service providers of electronic communications, and 
not even on the direct 'collection' by intelligence and law enforcement services themselves, as is cur-
rently the case with the privacy shield.  
Apart from this, the Court hackled that in the Data Retention directive '[there is] not only […] a general 
absence of limits’, and that ‘[it] also fails to lay down any objective criterion by which to determine the 
limits of the access of the competent national authorities to the data and their subsequent use for the 
purposes of prevention, detection or criminal prosecutions concerning offences that, in view of the 
extent and seriousness of the interference with the fundamental rights enshrined in Articles 7 and 8 
of the Charter, may be considered to be sufficiently serious to justify such an interference' (paragraph 
60). The Court continued that the 'Directive does not contain substantive and procedural conditions 
relating to the access of the competent national authorities to the data and to their subsequent use. 
Article 4 of the directive, which governs the access of those authorities to the data retained, does not 
expressly provide that that access and the subsequent use of the data in question must be strictly 
                                                 
37 See, f.i.: The economist (2016). Taking a bite at the Apple. The FBI’s legal battle with the maker of iPhones is an escalation 
of a long-simmering conflict about encryption and security, 27.02.2016. Available online via: http://www.econo-
mist.com/news/science-and-technology/21693564-fbis-legal-battle-maker-iphones-escalation.    
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restricted to the purpose of preventing and detecting precisely defined serious offences or of conduct-
ing criminal prosecutions relating thereto; it merely provides that each Member State is to define the 
procedures to be followed and the conditions to be fulfilled in order to gain access to the retained data 
in accordance with necessity and proportionality requirements' [emphasis added] (paragraph 61). Ul-
timately, and still with reference to 'access' and 'use', the Court lamented  that the directive 'does not 
lay down any objective criterion by which the number of persons authorised to access and subse-
quently use the data retained is limited to what is strictly necessary in the light of the objective pursued' 
and that '[a]bove all, the access by the competent national authorities to the data retained is not made 
dependent on a prior review carried out by a court or by an independent administrative body whose 
decision seeks to limit access to the data and their use to what is strictly necessary for the purpose of 
attaining the objective pursued and which intervenes following a reasoned request of those authorities 
submitted within the framework of procedures of prevention, detection or criminal prosecutions. Nor 
does it lay down a specific obligation on Member States designed to establish such limits' [emphasis 
added] (paragraph 62). Mutatus mutandis (in the context of the privacy shield it is not just about the 
collection of, access to and use of personal data by police and judicial authorities in the framework of 
serious criminal offences, but also by intelligence and law enforcement services in the context of na-
tional security, public interest and law enforcement) both the necessity and proportionality require-
ments can be firmly derived from the Data Retention judgement, and this with regards to the 'collec-
tion' of data on the one hand, and the 'access' to and 'use' of this data on the other. It was (as a mini-
mum) to be expected from the Commission's privacy shield-communication that it would, for the dis-
cerned phases of 'collection' and 'access and use' respectively, carefully and systematically inquire into 
the 'limitations' of US processing of and interference with EU personal data as presented by the US. 
This, even more so because of the prior operationalisation hereof by the Court's Data Retention judge-
ment. Unfortunately, we are presented with the manifest absence hereof. From a substantive perspec-
tive, it is moreover the case that the guarantees in terms of 'collection' are clearly insufficient, since 
e.g. bulk collection of data remains perfectly possible under certain scenario's. Not only - and contrary 
to how it is presented by the Commission - will the privacy shield fail to solve this with the limitations 
it contains in terms of 'access and use', the latter's limitations are inherently flawed as well, as they do 
not comply with nor mirror the (EU) requirements of strict necessity and proportionality.       
 
b. Bulk collection remains possible  
 
In itself it is gratifying (paragraph 58 of the draft adequacy decision) that under PPD-28 (the Presiden-
tial Policy Directive 28 of January 17, 2014)38 intelligence operations in the plane of sigint (Signals In-
telligence, or the interception of electronic communication) will from now on only be allowed for pur-
poses of foreign or contra-intelligence in support of government missions, and no longer with a view 
to benefit US companies' commercial interests. Sigint for industrial espionage, or to allow US compa-
nies to poach orders from European counterparts - which, as it turned out, happened inter alia with 
Echelon - has now been prohibited. Whoopty doo.    
 
As far as diversions go, this is a big one. Following the Schrems judgement, this is evidently no longer 
the stake. The real question is whether the limitations to data collection for government purposes in 
the fields of national security, public interest (other than for economic motives or to gain a competitive 
advantage) or law enforcement are convincing enough. The reality is they are not, and this regardless 
of the Commission's attempts to mask this. Yet, on the other hand, what we do get is an abundance of 
vague engagements on behalf of the US. The following is an anthology:     
 
Data collection under PPD-28 shall always be 'as tailored as feasible' (paragraph 58), and members of 
the intelligence community [emphasis added] 'should require that, wherever practicable, collection 
                                                 
38 Presidential Policy Directive -- Signals Intelligence Activities. Presidential policy directive/PPD-28, 17.01.2014. Available via: 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/01/17/presidential-policy-directive-signals-intelligence-activities.    
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should be focused on specific foreign intelligence targets or topics through the use of discriminants 
(e.g. specific  facilities,  selection  terms  and  identifiers' (paragraph 59). There is a little too much of 
'should' in this sentence for it to be genuinely convincing. Also, 'wherever practicable' is both very 
conditional and open-ended, and the mere use of 'discriminants' does evidently not guarantee com-
pliance with strict necessity and proportionality requirements. At the very most, they imply that bulk 
collection will not take place without at least some form of selection. Furthermore, the US engage-
ments coming from the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) recognise without much 
ado that bulk-sigint under 'specific' circumstances (that are not very 'specific' to begin with, like 'the 
identification of new or emerging threats') will still take place. The Commission from its part apparently 
considers it sufficiently reassuring that this may only take place when targeted collection through the 
use of discriminants is not deemed feasible 'due to technical or operational reasons'. The recognition 
by the Commission (dexterously stashed away in footnote 31) that the feasibility report, which was 
supposed to be presented to president Obama by the Director of National Intelligence with reference 
to the possibility to develop software that would make it easier for the intelligence community to 'ra-
ther conduct targeted instead of bulk-collection' [emphasis added], concluded that there is no soft-
ware-based alternative to replace bulk-collection entirely, apparently does not contradict this reason-
ing. On the contrary, the Commission smoothly rallies behind the ODNI's own estimation that bulk 
collection will not be the rule (rather than the exception) - as if that would be sufficient in light of the 
EU requirements in terms of collection. Similarly comforting to the Commission is that the assessment 
of when a more targeted collection would be deemed technically or operationally 'not feasible', is not 
left to the individual discretion of individual staff of the intelligence community (paragraph 60). Now 
that would have been a proper good deal wrong. In addition, the Commission sees an extra 'safeguard' 
in the fact that the potential 'discriminants' shall be determined by high ranking policy makers, and 
that they will be (re)evaluated on a regular basis (paragraph 60). Ultimately, the Commission seems 
fully convinced when the ODNI-engagements make it clear that bulk-sigint use will - in any case - re-
main 'limited' to a list of six 'specific' national security purposes (infra, under section c.). Limitations to 
the phase of 'use' do not, however, imply safeguards to the phase of 'collection'. This is rather basic in 
EU privacy law. To sum it up in the Commission's own view, the conclusion is that 'although not phrased 
in those legal terms', there is compliance with the EU requirements of necessity and proportionality 
(paragraph 63): bulk-collection needs to stay the exception rather than the rule, and should it never-
theless take place, the six 'strict' limitations for use are applicable. Rephrased in non-misleading terms: 
bulk-collection remains possible, and with this, collection is by no means compliant with the tight re-
strictions of EU privacy law in terms of data collection.  
 
c. Access and use do not comply with strict necessity and proportionality requirements 
 
The six 'specific' national security purposes (mentioned above) to which the bulk-sigint use will be 'lim-
ited' according to the ODNI-engagements are the following (page 4, third indent of annex VI to the 
draft adequacy decision): 'detecting and countering certain activities of foreign powers, counterterror-
ism, counter-proliferation, cybersecurity, detecting and countering threats to U.S. or allied armed 
forces, and combating transnational criminal threats, including sanctions evasion'. Downright volunta-
ristic is he who can discern the specificity hereof. Moreover, it remains an arduous task to assess these 
purposes überhaupt in the sense of 'restrictions', let alone that they would be convincing in light of the 
EU requirements in this field as operationalised in the Court's Data Retention judgement. Neverthe-
less, the Commission appears to classify such considerations as nitpicking. In its draft adequacy deci-
sion, the Commission even attempts to embellish all of this (paragraph 61) by not mentioning the six 
vague purposes by name, but by adducing their potential to detect and tackle threats in the sphere of 
espionage, terrorism and weapons of mass destruction, against armed forces or military personnel, or 
in the context of transnational crime. Such a misrepresentation is without honour. What we should be 
able to expect from the European Commission is that it protects the privacy of the European citizen 
and that it will inform the latter (via its communication and draft adequacy decision) in a clear and 
correct way, not that the Commission contemptuously approaches EU citizens with hollow and US-
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friendly rhetoric whilst continuing to give away their privacy via bulk-collection in order to facilitate 
almost any US-intelligence purpose. As if all of this weren't enough already, the above mentioned use- 
'limitations' will also be applicable for the collection of personal data that runs through trans-Atlantic 
submarine cables - and that as such are located outside of US territory - and this - at least according to 
the Commission - is the icing on the cake in terms of reassurance (paragraph 62). Just for completion,  
for this specific type of data, collection is not liable for a request conformant to FISA-legislation or 
through a so-called National Security Letter  of the FBI. Such a request - accentuated by the Commission 
- will be mandatory when the intelligence community wishes to retrieve information from companies 
on US territory that are 'self-certified' under the new privacy shield (paragraph 65).  
This type of 'access' - and for that matter, a relief that for once this term is utilised in its proper, genuine 
meaning - would continuously need to be specific and limited, as it would require specific terms of 
selection or criteria. The fact that this would (even) be applicable to the PRISM-programme is consid-
ered to be a real windfall, at least by the Commission: this information is after all selected on the basis 
of individual selection criteria like e.g. email addresses and telephone numbers, and not through key-
words or names of individuals (sic, paragraph 68). As the Commission itself cannot resist but stress, 
according to the Civil Liberties Oversight Board this would mean that in the US, when necessary, it 
would exclusively concern 'targeting specific [non-U.S.] persons about whom an individualised deter-
mination has been made'. Footnote 72 clarifies that the continuation of unleashing PRISM  on US com-
panies under the privacy shield will therefore not entail the undirected (unspecific) collection of data 
on a large scale. As you like it. PRISM apparently is not a programme for the collection of data on a 
large scale, or it is (at least) sufficiently selective to pass the test of European privacy law. As it seems, 
the Commission itself was mistaken when, at the end of November 2013, it claimed in its Safe Harbour 
communication that 'the large scale character of these programmes [...] [could] have as a consequence 
that, of all the data that was transferred in the framework of the safe harbour, more than was strictly 
necessary for, or proportionate to, the protection of national security, was consulted and further pro-
cessed by the American authorities, as was determined by the exception foreseen in the Safe Harbour 
decision.' Moreover, as the Commission is so eager to allege, there is empirical evidence that the 
amount of targets  affected through PRISM on a yearly basis is 'relatively small compared to the overall 
flow of data on the internet' (recital 69). The source for this statement is the 2014 annual report of the 
ODSI itself, hence it indeed appears that the PRISM-authorisation under FISA was applicable  'only'  to 
93.000 targets. Thus, nothing too large-scaly for the Commission. Add to this the ODSI-warranty (in 
annex VI to the draft adequacy decision) that the bulk-collection only takes place on a 'small proportion 
of the internet', this including the capturing of data on the trans-Atlantic cables (paragraph 69), and 
finally, everyone is convinced. Finally, what is added are a number of nugatory additional guarantees 
in the following paragraphs (70-74) like, for instance, that it is insufficient that sigint was collected over 
the course of the 'routine activities of a foreign person' to spread it or to retain it permanently without 
there being other intelligence-based reasons for this (recital 74). Hence, EU citizens may rest assured: 
electronic communication regarding their day-to-day routines will not be retained permanently when 
there are no well-founded reasons to do so. All of this leads the Commission to conclude (paragraph 
74) that, in the US, there are ample rules in place specifically designed as to insure that 'any interfer-
ence for purposes of national security with the fundamental rights of the persons whose data is trans-
ferred from the EU tot the US by means of the privacy shield, is limited to what is strictly necessary to 
realise that legitimate purpose' [emphasis added]. And with this alone the European citizen will have 
to make do. Those who thought that, following the Schrems judgement, there would be a real issue 
with the commercial transfers of personal data to the US simply because the companies on its territory 
had to run this data through the PRISM-filter were sorely mistaken. The Court based the invalidity of 
the Safe Harbour decision of the Commission on the techno-legal establishment that the latter had 
omitted to include in its decision that 'it must find, duly stating reasons, that the third country con-
cerned in fact ensures, by reason of its domestic law or its international commitments, a level of pro-
tection of fundamental rights essentially equivalent to that guaranteed in the EU legal order, a level 
that is apparent in particular from the preceding paragraphs of the present judgment' (paragraph 96). 
In essence, the Court herewith refers to the substantive criteria of the Data Retention judgement. The 
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European Commission's non-mentioning 'that the United States in fact ‘ensures’ an adequate level of 
protection by reason of its domestic law or its international commitments' (paragraph 97) was enough 
for the Court to decide on a techno-legal breakpoint, 'without there being any need to examine the 
content of the safe harbour principles' (paragraph 98). Unfortunately, this (and only this) seems to be 
precisely what the European Commission remembers from the Schrems judgement, and the (sole) rea-
son why the Commission seems convinced that its reasoned ascertainment of the adequate safeguards 
in the US' privacy regime will suffice. While the reasoning aspect of this ascertainment is without ques-
tion, the adequacy hereof is very equivocal - yet this was surely one of the Schrems judgement's de-
mands. In brief the presented argumentation is selective, often misleading, sometimes plain bogus. 
And last but not least, any effort to introduce a profound scrutiny based on the criteria as established 
in the Data Retention judgement was omitted by the Commission, contrarious to the Court's Schrems 
judgement that specifically referred hereto.  
 
 
d. Ombudsperson   
 
Elaborating on the ultimate 'safeguard' that was introduced via the creation of a privacy shield om-
budsperson is largely irrelevant. The Commission’s draft adequacy decision emphasises the independ-
ence of the mechanism, devoid of any instruction from the US intelligence community (paragraph 104). 
This notwithstanding, it suffices to say that it revolves around a vice-secretary of US State Department, 
an instance not without its partiality (to put it mildly) in terms of national security. Moreover, there is 
absolutely no direct EU-involvement in the ombudsperson mechanism. Putting two and two together, 
it becomes apparent that the Commission's viewpoint is rather gratuitous. Be as it may, the only real 
engagement of the ombudsperson is to evaluate potential complaints and to confirm that US legisla-
tion, including the aforementioned 'limitations' (which are, by repetition, insufficient in light of EU law) 
have been observed, and should that not be the case (which in such an event shall not be informed 
towards to plaintiff, nor whether he or she was the subject of a surveillance measure) whether this 
situation is resolved (paragraph 104 and point 4.e of annex III to the draft adequacy decision). Last but 
not least, the curtain is pulled on potential complaints featuring - with good reason - arguments that 
the privacy shield in itself is not conformant with EU data protection requirements. The ODNI letter to 
this point (annex III to the draft adequacy decision, point 4.g) simply, and laconically, states that the 
Ombudsperson mechanism shall in any such case refrain from being applicable. In any interpretation, 
this renders the Ombudsperson nothing more than a subterfuge measure.  
 
6. Limitations and safeguards regarding data collection in the interest of law enforcement or public 
interest 
 
In its draft adequacy decision, the Commission also evaluates the data protection-relevant limitations 
and safeguards afforded by US law within the law enforcement sphere. At the risk of sounding redun-
dant, very much like all of the above, the Commission's conclusion is non-surprisingly that the US data 
protection level is to be considered as adequate (paragraph 106). Search and seizure by law enforce-
ment authorities principally requires, according to the 4th amendment, a prior court order based on 
'probable cause'. In certain circumstances, however,  the 4th amendment is not applicable because for 
some forms of electronic communication there are no legitimate privacy expectations. In such an 
event, a court order is not mandatory, and law enforcement may revert to a 'reasonability test'. The 
latter simply implies that a consideration is made between the level of infringement of an investigative 
measure with respect to an individual's privacy and the extent to which that measure is deemed nec-
essary in function of legitimate government purposes like law enforcement (or another public inter-
est). For the European Commission, this suffices to conclude that this 'captures the idea’ of necessity 
and proportionality under EU law (paragraph 107). The cold fact that the 4th amendment is quite 
simply not applicable to non-US citizens outside of US territory does not change the Commission's 
viewpoint. The reasoning is that EU citizens would receive and enjoy the indirect protection that US 
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companies - where their data is being stored - enjoy. The establishment that such a protection can be 
bypassed fairly easily via a simple reasonability test, and that the privacy of a company is not automat-
ically at stake when law enforcement are after the private data of a user (only), is conveniently not 
addressed. According to the Commission, there are furthermore additional protective mechanisms, 
like for instance directives of the ministry of justice that allow law enforcement access to private data 
only based on grounds that are labelled by the Commission as 'equivalent' to the necessity and pro-
portionality requirement: these directives after all stipulate that the FBI must take recourse to the least 
intrusive measure (paragraph 108). That such a principle only addresses the subsidiarity of applying 
certain investigative measures, instead of dealing with their necessity or proportionality will probably 
be considered as nitpicking again. Finally, the Commission deals with the practice of administrative 
subpoenas (as issued at the time against the SWIFT US-hub). These are, as can be read,  allowed only 
in particular circumstances and are subject to an independent judicial appraisal. What remains under-
emphasized - perhaps not to spoil the fun - is that the latter is only a possibility when a company 
refuses to spontaneously give effect to an administrative subpoena, thus forcing the government to 
have recourse to a judge for effectuating said subpoena.  
Likewise, when administrative subpoenas are issued in the public interest, similar limitations (so we 
learn in paragraph 110) are applicable. After all, administrations are only allowed to order access to 
data that is deemed relevant for matters under their competence - who would have thought any dif-
ferent? - and of course need to pass through the aforementioned reasonability test. All the more rea-
son for the Commission, without wasting any more words on the matter - to promptly come to a con-
clusion (paragraph 111) similar to the one on the collection of data in view of national security. As it is 
seemingly evidently stated, the US has rules in place that are specifically designed so that 'any inter-
ference for purposes of law enforcement or another public interest with the fundamental rights of 
persons whose data are transferred from the EU to the US under the privacy shield, will be limited  to 
what is strictly necessary to realise that legitimate purpose' [emphasis added] and 'that guarantee an 
effective judicial protection against such interferences'.         
      
7. Conclusion 
 
The European Commission’s draft adequacy decision is all the added value of a scrap of paper, nothing 
more: insufficient, lacking credibility, misleading. The Commission has nevertheless gone through the 
lengths to extensively set forth why all of us should believe that the 'limitations' and 'safeguards' avail-
able under US law are in line with the EU requirements of strict necessity and proportionality. The 
Schrems case, apparently, hasn’t changed anything. The privacy shield is nothing but a new jackstraw 
for the previous Safe Harbour approach. As it is, we are simply presented with the same old thing in a 
new coat of paint, without any intrinsic change in the situation in the US. None of the US harbours 
have become safer, PRISM and the likes remain on track. But was anyone naïve enough to think differ-
ently? The only novel thing is that the European Commission has gone above and beyond to = a Trojan 
horse - that is all the privacy shield really is - and then push it in front of the EU's gates. Heed the EU 
citizen not to take it inside!  
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